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Iran: A New Challenge to EU Foreign Policy
♦ 
Roberto Dominguez
♣ 
 
Introduction  
 
The recent debate on nuclear proliferation indicates that the international arrangements of the 
Cold War are currently insufficient to address the transformations in the use of nuclear energy.  
This issue requires a more comprehensive response from the nuclear club to effectively face the 
present  and  future  energy  demands  as  well  as  the  insecurity  concerns.      The  Stockholm 
International  Peace  Research  Institute  names  13  nations  that  could  “go  nuclear”  in  the  next 
decade, including: Algeria, Indonesia, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.
1  In this context, Iran has 
certainly  challenged  the  status  quo  of  the  nuclear  powers.    Nonetheless,  the  Iranian  nuclear 
ambition is just a part of the narrative in the complete story of nuclear proliferation.  
Iran is significant for the European Union from various perspectives.  First, it is a litmus 
test  for  the  EU  foreign  policy  credibility  vis–à–vis  the  United  States,  particularly  after  the 
European debacle in Iraq in 2003.  Second, if the EU succeeds in persuading Iran to fully comply 
with the IAEA requirements, the European approach of persuasion and constructive engagement 
will undermine the voices, particularly in the United States, that prefer military forces to deal 
with Iran. Third, it substantiates the aim of the European Union as a civilian power and promoter 
of democracy and human rights in the region. 
The analysis of the relationship between the European Union and Iran involves various 
levels of analysis. The first is how public opinion perceives Iran as a threat; the second is based 
on the policies of the main member states of the EU; the third refers to the role of the European 
Union as an international actor; the fourth and most general is about the participation of the 
United States and United Nations in inducing Iran to abide by international commitments on 
nuclear energy. Against this background, the argument of this paper is that the EU has played the 
role of international consensus maker in dealing with the Iranian nuclear program.  
 
What do Europeans Think about Iran? 
 
Perceptions play an important but not necessarily decisive role in foreign policy. War is not 
always popular.  The Rally-Round-the-Flag effect, which is the ability of a nation’s leader to 
gather popular support for foreign policy initiatives, especially during international crisis, is not 
always effectively conveyed by the elites.  In 2003, the decision of the British government to 
wage a war against Iraq was contrary to its prevailing public opinion.  In other cases, the action of 
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some  European  governments  such  as  France  or  Germany  was  consistent  with  the  popular 
rejection to invade Iraq.  In general, the war in Iraq has been unpopular in the eyes of public 
opinion, in Europe. 
After the United States and the coalition of willing invaded Iraq, the numerous European 
attempts to negotiate with Iran and the consistent Iranian rejection to be transparent about the 
reach of its nuclear program, has led the American and European public opinion to increasingly 
perceive Iran as a threat.  In the case of the public opinion in the United States, the majority of the 
population  assumes  that  Iran  is  a  threat  to  the  nuclear  status  quo,  while  Europeans  tend  to 
perceive a nuclear Iran as a threat but less emphatically than the American public opinion.  In a   
survey conducted in 2007 by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the findings show 
that 83 percent of Americans and 68 percent of Europeans agreed that a nuclear Iran would lead 
to further proliferation in the Middle East.  Similarly, 54 percent of Europeans believed that a 
nuclear  Iran  has  the  potential  to  threaten  Europe.    If  Iran  was  to  acquire  nuclear  weapons, 
Americans (82 percent) and Europeans (68 percent) concurred it would supply nuclear weapons 
to terrorists.
2 
It is important to bear in mind that certainly there is trend to perceive Iran as a potential 
threat, more acutely in the United States than in Europe. However, there is a gulf of difference as 
to the means to be used.  In the United States, the likelihood of a military intervention is open to   
electoral and congressional debate. The suggestion of a European military participation in Iran is 
viewed disapprovingly by the public in Europe.  
 
Do EU Member States Share a Common Approach towards Iran? 
 
The overarching European perception of Iran varies when the member states of the EU implement 
policies. National political cultures, interest groups and economic links interplay in the formation 
of political preferences in foreign policy.  Thus, while Britain and France concur on the strategy 
of joint European action and rough new multilateral sanctions even outside the UN Security 
Council,  other  countries,  notably  Italy  and  Austria,  want  significantly  less  serious  steps. 
Germany, Robin Wright asserts, “fell somewhere between.”
 3  
Policymakers of the key European countries are confronting the dilemma of continuing or 
revisiting the approach to Iran, given that, after four years of critical dialogue and engagement 
with Tehran through negotiations led by the EU-3 -France, Germany and Great Britain- Europe 
has barely influenced the Iranian stance on the controversial nuclear agenda.
4 The current strategy 
used by EU-3 is under pressure to deliver by the United States.   Even Barack Obama, who is 
considered to be the less antagonistic of the Presidential candidates has voiced his frustration with 
respect to the role of EU-3.  He has stated:  “We cannot unconditionally rule out an approach that 
could prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. We have tried limited, piecemeal talks while 
we outsource the sustained work to our European allies. It is time for the United States to lead.”
5 
France  has  traditionally  played  a  protagonist  role  in  setting  the  tone  of  the  external 
European voice and in the building of the EU relations with Iran.  In his first significant speech 
on  foreign  policy  after  his  election  in  May  2007,  President  Nicolas  Sarkozy  reiterated  his 
opposition to the Turkish membership,
6 and also said that Iran could be attacked militarily if it did 
not live up to its international obligations to curb its nuclear program, although he was unclear as 
                                                           
2 German Marshall Fund of the United States, Transatlantic Trends.  Key Findings 2007,  September 2007, 4 
(www.transatlantictrends.org, accessed October 2007). 
3 Robin, Wright, “Divisions in Europe May Thwart U.S. Objectives on Iran,” Washington Post, October 18, 2007. 
4 Emanuele Ottolenghi.  “Iran: The Looming Threat,” Liberal Magazine, November 30, 2007 
(http://www.transatlanticinstitute.org/html/pu_articles.html?id=39, accessed December 26, 2007)  5
 Remarks of Senator Barack Obama, AIPAC Policy Conference, Washington, DC, June 4, 2008. 
6 John Lichfield, “Sarkozy softens his opposition to Ankara’s membership of the EU,” The Independent 28 August, 
2007.  
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to whether or not France would ever participate in military action against Iran or even tacitly 
support such an approach.
7  After a seemingly imprecise declaration in September 2007 by the 
French foreign affairs minister, Bernard Kouchner, who stated that France was preparing for the 
‘worst’ situation with Iran, Sarkozy stated “I don’t want to hear anything else that would not 
contribute  usefully  to  the  discussion  today.’  ‘For  my  part,  I  don’t  use  the  word  war.”
  8  The 
position of France can be explained with two lines of reasoning.  The first is that by hardening the 
French position, Sarkozy is aligning itself with the United States  on international policy in order 
to take a more assertive and effective role on the world stage.
9  The second is that the hardening 
of the French position does not equate to any attempt of military intervention, particularly taking 
into consideration the French economic interests in Iran.  For instance, in 2007,  Total
10 formed a 
$  2  billion  venture  with  the  government-owned  National  Iranian  Oil  Corporation  and 
PETRONAS of Malaysia, known as Pars LNG.  The aim of which is to produce 8 million metric 
tons of liquefied natural gas a year- equal to about 15 percent of current world output.
11 
Germany represents one of the more relevant actors in the relations with Iran. Michael 
Tockuss, former President of the German-Iranian Chamber of Commerce in Tehran, has asserted 
that “some two thirds of Iranian industry relies on German engineering products,” calculation that 
reflects the Iranian dependency on German spare parts and suppliers.”
12   
  In spite of the economic interests, German-Iran relations have deteriorated since 2004.  In 
the political sphere, Chancellor Angela Merkel condemned Mr. Ahmadinejad’s statements on 
Israel and the Holocaust.  In a speech in February 2006, she said, “A president who questions 
Israel’s  right  to  exist,  a  president  who  denies  the  Holocaust,  cannot  expect  to  receive  any 
tolerance from Germany.  We have learned our history.”
13 On the economic side, Germany’s 
Economics Ministry has also scaled back the export credit guarantees it issues for trade with Iran 
to $1.2 billion in 2005 from $3.3 billion in 2004.   But German companies still exported $5.7 
billion worth of goods to Iran in 2006, up from $5 billion in 2004.  Privately, American and 
Israeli officials express frustration that Germany has been more resistant than Britain or France to 
reducing commercial ties with Iran.  With Germany’s hold on the Iranian market so unsettled, 
experts say China has overtaken it as the largest trade partner.  At least 1,700 German companies 
are active in Iran, including household names like Siemens and BASF.
14 
 
The EU and Iran: Diplomacy beyond the EU-3 
 
The machinery of the external relations of the European Union is the result of the amalgamation 
of  the  willingness  of  the  member  states  and  the  community  institutions  to  pursue  concrete 
                                                           
7 Elaine Sciolino, “French Leader Raises Possibility of Force in Iran,” New York Times August 28, 2007.  
8 Elaine Sciolino and Alison Smale, “A Frenchman in a Hurry Maps His Path: Sarkozy Seeks to Align rance, and 
Rest of Europe, With US,” New York Times, September 24, 2007.  
9 James Blitz, “France hardens stance on Iran with call for European sanctions,” Financial Times September 18, 
2007.  
10 Total is one of France’s largest corporations and the world's fourth largest publicly-traded integrated international 
oil and gas company. With operations in more than 130 countries, Total engages in all aspects of the petroleum 
industry, including Upstream operations (oil and gas exploration, development and production, LNG) and Downstream 
operations (refining, marketing and the trading and shipping of crude oil and petroleum products). Total also produces 
base chemicals (petrochemicals and fertilizers) and specialty chemicals for the industrial and consumer markets. In 
addition, Total has interests in the coal mining and power generation sectors, as well as a financial interest in Sanofi-
Aventis 
11 Realité, “France’s Economic ties with Iran,” Backgrounders. (http://www.realite-eu.org/site-
/apps/nl/content3.asp?c=9dJBLLNkGiF&b=2315291&ct=44, accessed, October 2007). 
12 Realité,  “Germany’s Economic ties to Iran,” Backgrounders/Fact Sheet (http://www.realite-
eu.org/site/apps/nl/content3.asp?c=9djBLLNkGiF&ct=44, accessed November 2007). 
13 Mark Landler, “Germany’s Commercial Ties with Iran Prove Hard to Cut,” New York Times International, 
September 21, 2007. 
14 Ibid.  
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objectives in the international sphere.  While the community institutions attempt to develop an 
integral vision encompassing the multiplicity of interest in the EU-27, the member states display 
their international presence depending on their interests in the region and/or the issue in the 
international agenda.  While in the case of Latin America, Spain plays a relevant role in leading 
EU relations with that region, in the case of the security agenda in Iran and due to its prevalent 
role in the making of EU relations, France, the United Kingdom and Germany have taken the 
leading voice in the EU-3 group. 
At  the  level  of  the  community  institutions,  the  relationship  between  the  EU  and  the 
Iranian Theocracy is quite.  In fact, there is no delegation of the European Commission in Tehran, 
while the Iranian embassy in Brussels is accredited to the EC. The Iranian-EU relations foreign 
policy has gone through four phases. The first phase, from 1979 to 1989, followed a transatlantic 
solidarity (Europe-United States) and might be characterized as a Cold Peace.
15 The second phase 
(1989-1997) is marked by diplomatic and economic reforms in Iran, which cleared the way to 
explore investment opportunities and improve diplomatic relations, particularly with France.
16 
The  third  phase  (1997-2003)  promoted  and  deepened  the  bilateral  relations  in  all  areas;  the 
reformist regime of President Khatami was a key element to the development of mutual trust with 
Europeans.  The  fourth  and  final  phase  started  in  2003;  regressions  in  some  of  the  reforms 
implemented by Khatami and radicalization in the government of President Ahmadinejad have 
brought about skepticism in Europe. 
 
Political Relations 
 
The EU-Iran relationship showcased an increased dynamism during the second half of the 1990s, 
particularly after the election of President Khatami.  In 1998, a Comprehensive Dialogue in the 
form of semi-annual troika meetings was established covering a variety of themes from regional 
issues to energy.  Subsequently, high-level working groups on energy and transport as well as on 
trade and investment were established in 1999 and 2000, respectively.  Furthermore, in 2001 the 
Commission adopted a Communication setting out the conditions for a trade and cooperation 
agreement (TCA).  The negotiations for the TCA were launched in Brussels in December 2002, 
while both parties also held a troika meeting and an NGO roundtable in Tehran on Human Rights, 
marking the start of the Human Rights Dialogue.  
The expectations were still high with the re-election of Khatami, but they were deflated 
as a result of the modest pace of the political reform and the general elections in early 2004, 
which were held under conditions criticized by the EU.  As a result, the Comprehensive Dialogue 
between the EU and Iran was suspended by Iran in December 2003 and no meeting within the 
framework  of  the  EU–Iran  Human  Rights  Dialogue  has  taken  place  since  June  2004.  The 
negotiations for the TCA were stalled in June 2003.
17  
Lacking a general framework for the bilateral relationship, the contacts between the two 
parties have been around the Iranian nuclear program.  The EU-3, supported by the HR/SG Javier 
Solana,  seized  the  initiative  in  October  2003,  by  offering  a  generous  package  of  economic 
incentives; in exchange, Iran would accept to suspend uranium enrichment and allow intrusive 
inspections of the IAEA by signing the ‘Additional Protocol’ to the NPT.  This diplomatic victory 
was translated in the so-called Paris Agreement which states that  
    Iran reaffirms that, in accordance with Article II of the NPT, it does 
not and will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons. It commits itself to full 
cooperation and transparency with the IAEA. Iran will continue to implement 
                                                           
15 Ziba Moshaver, “Revolution, Theocratic Leadership and Iran’s Foreign Policy; Implications for Iran-EU 
Relations,” Review of International Affairs 3, no. 2, Winter 2003, 292. 
16 Moshaver, 293. 
17 The European Commission, The EU’s Relations Iran, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/iran/in-tro/index.htm, 
accessed May 25, 2008).  
 
7 
7 
the  Additional  Protocol  voluntarily  pending  ratification.  To  build  further 
confidence, Iran has decided, on a voluntary basis, to continue and extend its 
suspension to include all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, and 
specifically:  the  manufacture  and  import  of  gas  centrifuges  and  their 
components; the assembly, installation, testing or operation of gas centrifuges; 
work to undertake any plutonium separation, or to construct or operate any 
plutonium separation installation; and all tests or production at any uranium 
conversion installation.
18 
 
After the signature of the Paris Agreement, the TCA negotiation resumed.  Rounds V, VI 
and  VII  took  place  in  2005.  However,  following  Iran’s  breach  of  the  Paris  Agreement  by 
resuming uranium conversion at the Esfahan plant, the TCA and the political dialogue agreement 
negotiations were suspended once again by the Commission.  
During a visit to Tehran on June 5-6, 2006, the HR/SG Javier Solana presented to the 
Iranian authorities the new proposals of the international community for opening negotiations on 
Iran’s nuclear program. The result of the proposal was not satisfactory for the European Union 
and in a press statement by P. Douste-Blazy the EU asserted that   
    The Iranians have given no indication at all that they are ready to engage seriously on 
the  substance  of  our  proposals.  Iran  has  failed  to  take  the  steps  needed  to  allow 
negotiations  to  begin,  specifically  the  suspension  of  all  enrichment  related  and 
reprocessing activities, as required by the IAEA. We express profound disappointment 
over this situation. In this context, we have no choice but to return to the United Nations 
Security Council and take forward the process that was suspended two months ago. We 
have agreed to seek a United Nations Security Council Resolution which would make 
the IAEA-required suspension mandatory. 
19 
 
The 2006 proposal included a promise to support the construction of light water nuclear 
reactors and the sale of commercial planes to Iran, a conference on regional security issues, a 
long-term energy partnership between the EU. As of mid-2008, Iran has not relinquished its right 
to suspend the enrichment and processing activities as requested by the IAEA.  
  The agenda with Iran has also faced two other issues that have strained the diplomatic 
dialogue.  The first is the Iranian statements on Israel.  The Commissioner for External Relations 
& European Neighborhood Policy, Benita Ferrero Walner, stated before the European Parliament 
that “we must utterly condemn the totally unacceptable remarks about the State of Israel made by 
the Iranian Head of State, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad…. (later she added) it is time to draw a line 
and to remind the Iranian President of the responsibilities that come with being a member of the 
family of nations.”
20  Under Khatami’s Presidency there was an unspoken agreement that Iran 
would not obstruct the Peace Process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority; with the open 
defiance of President Ahmadinejad, the civilian diplomatic power of the European Union has 
been strongly affected, particularly because it strengthens the position of hardliners in United 
States and Israel and undermines the EU position of dialogue.  
The second issue is with respect to human rights in Iran.  The European Union is alarmed 
by an increasing erosion of the freedom of expression, opinion and association as well as by the 
latest developments with regard to the harassment of minority groups, the denial of women’s 
                                                           
18 International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran-EU Agreement on Nuclear Program, November 14, 2004 
(http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/eu_iran14112004.shtml).  
19 Press statement by P. Douste-Blazy on behalf of the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, the Russian 
Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the High Representative of the European Union, 
Paris, July 12th 2006. (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/iran/doc/2006_press_st-at_iran_nuclear_12-07-06.pdf).  
20 Benita Ferrero Waldner, Statement on recent declarations by the President of Iran (European Parliament, 
Strasbourg, 16 November 2005 - SPEECH/05/696).  
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rights, and the intimidation of lawyers and human rights defenders such as the imprisonment of 
the  Iranian  academic  Dr.  Ramin  Jahanbegloo.
21    Consequently,  the  European  Union  has 
repeatedly supported UN Resolutions on the situation of human rights in Iran such as the one 
brought forward by Canada to the 60th General Assembly in 2005.  The Council of the EU has 
also  adopted  conclusions  expressing  EU’s  serious  concern  with  regard  to  the  deteriorating 
situation of human rights in Iran, which is at total variance with the EU policy on that matter.  
Despite the current difficulties in the area of human rights, the European Initiative for Democracy 
and  Human  Rights  (EIDHR)  has  promoted  four  projects  with  an  estimated  budget  of  €3.9 
million, in partnership with UNICEF, UNODC, UNDP and the British Institute for International 
and Comparative Law.   
 
Economic Relations 
 
Iran's current account surplus, low debt and comfortable level of reserves have helped to protect 
the economy from external shocks, such as the aftermath of September 11. Yet, the country faces 
a difficult challenge in trying to accelerate the pace of reform and to create new jobs for its young 
population and to further reduce the still high unemployment rate.  
The role of trade in the EU-Iran relationship is explained differently depending on the 
particular perspective of each party.  While the EU is the most important trade partner for Iran, 
however it represented only 1.23 percent of the EU’s total exports in 2004.  With regard to the 
behavior  of  the  balance  of  trade,  the  EU  trade  relationship  with  Iran  has  traditionally  been 
negative due to large imports in the energy sector.  Interestingly, despite rising energy prices, the 
EU’s balance of trade was positive in 2002 and 2004 and the surplus in the later years amounted 
to €3.7bn.  As for trade in services, Iran’s share of total EU trade in this sector is only 0.3 
percent.  On the other hand, foreign direct investment of the EU (25 member states counted) 
remains at a low level and unstable: from 2001 to 2003, inward stocks have been slowly declining 
from €2.2bn to €1.8bn.  
Against the backdrop of the economic figures, the EU has constantly reminded Iran that 
the  prospect  of  greater  economic,  political,  and  security  cooperation,  including  trade  and 
investment incentives and support for Iran’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
on the one hand, and progress in the areas of political dialogue and counter-terrorism, one the 
other  hand,  are  interdependent,  inseparable  and  mutually  reinforcing  elements  of  the  global 
approach which is the basis for progress in the EU-Iran relations.
22  
 
Co-operation 
 
A general bilateral cooperation scheme is still absent in the EU-Iran relationship.  In this context, 
the  fragmented  cooperation  is  largely  concentrated  on  counter-narcotics  and  Afghan  refugee 
assistance programs as well as on the support of the European Union to UN programs on human 
rights and disaster relief operations in Iran 
The most substantial EU resources are allocated in the area of counter-narcotics policies 
in Iran.  The bilateral dialogue remains active largely via the Dublin Group and the respective 
mini-Dublin  Group  on  Iran.    In  2005,  the  European  Commission  allocated  €1.2  million  to 
support demand reduction initiatives in Iran, focusing on local NGO networks working in the area 
                                                           
21 Council of the European Union, Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the case of the 
Iranian academic Dr. Ramin Jahanbegloo, Brussels, 10 July 2006, 11421/06 (Presse 211).  
22 EU-Presidency and Commission Joint Press Release on the opening of the negotiations with Iran IP/02/1880 - 
Brussels, 12 December 2002. The EU-Iran Working Group on Trade and Investment met for the first time in November 
2000 in Tehran to discuss possibilities to foster the increase and diversification of trade and investments between the 
two parties. A third meeting in 2002 was followed by a fourth meeting in November 2003. A fifth meeting has not yet 
taken place.  
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of  demand  control  for  narcotics  and  harm  reduction.  Furthermore,  another  €1.2  million  was 
assigned to an inter-regional initiative on Afghanistan neighborhood precursors with a view to 
better control cross-border trafficking of narcotics.   
In view of the global combat against terrorism, the stability in Afghanistan is of the 
paramount relevance to the international community.  Iran has been affected by the instability in 
the region with a refugee population of approximately 2.5 million, the majority of whom are from 
Afghanistan.  The situation of such refugees is primarily a humanitarian problem because the 
majority  of  them  are  unable  to  satisfy  their  basic  human  needs.    In  2005  the  European 
Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) assigned €750 thousand to support an UNHCR 
program in Iran for the repatriation of Afghan refugees.  Further assistance to increase water 
supply and improve sanitation for Afghan refugees has been under consideration. 
 
Other significant actors  
 
The diplomatic strategies of the European Union can be reinforced or undermined as a result of 
the cooperation or lack of it by other significant actors, particularly the United States and Russia.  
Due  to  the  massive  economic  and  human  resources  drained  as  a  result  of  the  Iraqi 
conflict, the United States found in the European Union a partner that could deflate the Iranian 
nuclear ambitions.  On the one hand, Iran has certainly stopped the nuclear weapons program. In 
fact,  the  U.S.  National  Intelligence  Estimate,  a  coordinated  body  of  the  U.S.  intelligence 
community’s 16 agencies, released a report in December 2007 in which it said Iran had halted its 
nuclear  weapons  program  in  2003.
23  For  the  experts,  however,  this  information  was  not 
convincing since the main problem with Iran is not about weaponization, but fissile material 
production. It is this area that poses a challenge to international community. 
Iran has been reluctant to adopt the European bid.  While the United States skeptically 
observed the diplomatic efforts of the EU until 2006, it has since become more engaged in the 
diplomatic front jointly with the European Union.  At the meeting of the board of governors of 
the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  on  March  5,  2008,  Simon  Smith,  UK’s  IAEA 
ambassador, speaking on behalf of the EU-3, said that “over a wide range of issues on which the 
agency asked for clarification the answers (from Iran) are less than satisfactory.”
24 In May 2008, 
the EU-3+3 (China, Russia and the United States) updated the offer to Iran and highlighted the 
willingness of the big powers to help Iran develop its modern nuclear program by supplying it 
with light water reactors, a major concession from Washington.
25  There are no signs, however, 
that the Iranian government will accept the new offer. 
In  the  case  of  Russia,  the  bilateral  cooperation  with  Iran  is  strengthening,  however 
disagreements between both parties also exists.  Three events illustrate the recent bilateral trends.  
The first is the visit of then-Russia's President Vladimir Putin to Tehran in October 2007, the first 
visit ever of a Russian head of state. The second is more concrete; two months after President 
Putin’s visit, Russia sent two shipments to Iran with atomic fuel for its Russian-built nuclear 
reactor in Iran.  However, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov echoed U.S. President George 
W. Bush's viewpoint that the supply of Russian nuclear fuel to Iran makes it unnecessary for 
Tehran to enrich its own uranium -- something that Russia along with the United States and the 
European Union fear could result in Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. The third was the Iranian 
defense minister's announcement at the end of December 2007 that Moscow would supply Tehran 
with advanced S-300 air defense missiles. Almost immediately after, Moscow flatly denied this.
26  
                                                           
23 Reuters, “Iran Welcomes U.S. Report,” New York Times, December 4, 2007.  
24 Leigh Phillips, “EU-3 push for answers from Teheran over new nuclear allegations”, EUobserver, March 6, 2008. 
25 Elaine Sciolino, “Big Powers to offer sweeteners to Iran,” International Herald Tribune, May 2, 2008. 
26 Mark N. Katz, “Russia and Iran: Unfriendly friends,” Middle East Times, January 02, 2008.  
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Venezuela is another actor that has become a significant partner for Iran. The oil reserves 
and anti-Americanism are the common platform for this alliance, although cooperation in energy 
has been vital for this relationship.  In July 2007, the two presidents launched the construction of 
a joint petrochemical plant with an annual capacity of 1.65 million tons on Iran’s Gulf coast.  
Iranian officials said a second methanol plant would be constructed in Venezuela.  Each of the 
two  plants  would  cost  $650  million  to  $700  million  and  take  four  years  to  complete.    The 
expectations both the countries have is to increase their market access: Iran to the Latin American 
market,  while  Venezuela  to  buyers  in  India  and  Pakistan.
27    With  regard  to  the  shared  anti-
Americanism, numerous statements have been made by both counties. One of the most infamous 
moments in their alliance was made during a visit of President Chavez to Iran in September 2006, 
when he spoke in support of Iran’s nuclear program and asserted: “What gives the U.S. the 
right… to stop any country developing nuclear power for peaceful purposes? (and added) “We 
don’t want another war, but there will be disastrous consequences if Iran is attacked.”
28 
 
Sanctions and Incentives 
 
The positions of the United States and Russia to some extent vary from the view of the European 
Union.  Nonetheless, at least in the diplomatic arena, there has been a gradual convergence since 
2006. Despite these different positions, there is a consensus amongst  most of the EU members 
that a combination of sanctions and incentives would encourage Iran to be more transparent in its 
nuclear activities and less aggressive towards Israel.  This duality of a) policy of sanctions and b) 
incentives  operates  at  three  different  levels.  The  first  is  the  global,  which  is  based  on  the 
negotiations in the IAEA in Vienna and the Security Council as a diplomatic body of last resort.  
The consensus is hard to reach in the Security Council, particularly in light of the divergent 
positions of Russia and China, on the one hand, and France, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, on the other.  Nonetheless, the Security Council has passed three resolutions against Iran 
(1737, 1747 and 1803), the most recent one was adopted in March 2008. 
The second level is the regional, where EU has taken on the role of the main actor. After 
a decrease of activities between the Commission and Iran since 2003, the Council of the EU has 
also approved actions to enforce UN resolutions.  For instance, in April 2008, the EU’s Political 
and  Security  Committee  placed  the  largest  Iranian  bank,  Bank  Melli,  on  a  list  of  Iranian 
institutions and personalities that the EU would boycott.
29 Likewise, Europe has  gone farther 
than the Security Council by sanctioning 24 entities not named by UN Resolutions 1737 and 
1747, and has prohibited some transactions that are not delineated in either resolution.
30 
Finally,  the  third  level  of  sanctions  and  incentives  is  based  on  the  diplomacy  of  the 
member states.  For the EU member states it is difficult to remain silent about the statements 
made by President Ahmadinejad against Israel; he has reiterated in numerous occasions that Israel 
would  soon  disappear  off  the  map.    This  type  of  diplomatic  position  has  isolated  Iran  from 
European diplomacy, as it happened in the UN food summit in June 2008.
31  
 
Conclusions 
 
                                                           
27 Realite.  “The Chavez-Iran Alliance,” Backgrounders/Fact Sheet (http://www.realite-
eu.org/site/apps/nl/content3.asp?c=9dJBLLNkGiF&b=2315291&ct=44, accessed October 2007) 
28 Quoted in Realite.  “The Chavez-Iran Alliance,” Backgrounders/Fact Sheet (http://www.realite-
eu.org/site/apps/nl/content3.asp?c=9dJBLLNkGiF&b=2315291&ct=44, accessed October 2007) 
29 Herb Keinon, “EU set to blacklist leading Iranian bank,” The Jerusalem Post, April 29, 2008.  
30 Neil Crompton, “The European View on Iran: Fallout from New US Intelligence Estimate,” Policy Watch 1320, 
The Washington Institute of Near East Policy, December 17, 2007. 
31 Silvia Aloisi, “Ahmadinejad, Mugabe given cold shoulder at summit,” Boston Globe, June 3, 2008; see also 
Thomas Friedman, “People vs. Dinosaurs,” New York Times, June 8, 2008.  
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The role of the EU-3 in Iran can be evaluated from two perspectives.  The first is to take as the 
yardstick the absolute achievement of the political objective, where the EU-3 appears to have 
failed. John Bolton arguing along this line states: “Ironically and disastrously, the renewed EU-3 
effort produced exactly the opposite effect. Over the next three and a half years, it gave Iran 
precisely what it needed most: time to overcome the difficulties of mastering the nuclear fuel 
cycle.”
32 The second perspective is to observe the EU-3 as a coalition builder,
33 where the EU has 
played the role of mediator and consensus builder; likewise, it has also blocked a nuclear domino 
effect and enlarged its informal membership from EU-3 to EU-3+3 or P5+1.   
In light of the new US administration in January 2009 and the dominant role of the 
United States in world affairs, it is crucial for the EU to remind the international community that 
categorizations  such  as  the  “axis  of  evil”  have  strengthened  considerably  the  position  of  the 
conservative nationalist in Iran.
34 At the same time, the creation within Iraq of a Shi’a-dominated 
province considerably increases Tehran’s influence within the country in particular and the region 
in general.
35 
In the opening paragraph of this paper, it was argued that Iran is only a partial story of the 
proliferation of a nuclear nations and that a new international arrangement must be pursued by the 
international community. However, there are no prospects for a sweeping reform of the nuclear 
international order in the foreseeable future. At the same time, Iran has been firm on its objective 
of increasing its nuclear capabilities. On May 26, 2008, the IAEA’s Director-General, Mohamed 
ElBaradei,  sent  a  report  to  the  UN  Security  Council,  stating  that  Iran  has  not  cooperated  in 
answering detailed questions about its highly controversial nuclear enrichment program.
36 Is there 
any solution? 
One of the scenarios is US intervention. Currently, the US military is overstretched and 
any military intervention can be perilous due to the certain characteristics of Iran.  Likewise, the 
international community would hardly support such an enterprise. The second scenario points to 
the direction of the diplomatic effort and recent offer of the EU-3+3.  This makes the current EU-
3 approach to dealing with Iran the most feasible scenario. Along these lines, William Luers, 
Thomas R. Pickering and Jim Walsh have also proposed a solution close to the reviewed package 
of 2006. This initiative states that the US and its allies should propose turning Iran’s national 
enrichment efforts into a multinational program. Under this approach, the Iranian government 
would agree to allow two or more additional governments (for example, France and Germany) to 
participate in the management and operation of activities in Iran.  In exchange, Iran would be able 
to jointly own and operate an enrichment facility without facing international sanctions and enjoy 
a variety of other benefits such as membership into WTO, increased trade with Europe, access to 
equipment  for  its  aviation  and  energy  industries,  and  perhaps  normalized  relations  with  the 
United States.
37 In this regard, the EU-3+3 must be  clear about the incentives offered to Iran, 
while the Persian nation must also understand the loses of pursuing  the security dilemma in the 
region. 
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